This paper asks whether tax cycles can represent the optimal policy in a model without any extrinsic uncertainty. I show, in an economy without capital and where labor is the only choice variable (a Lucas-Stokey economy), that a large class of preferences exists, where cycles are optimal, as well as a large class where they are not. The larger government expenditures are, the larger the class of preferences for which cycles are optimal becomes. Tax cycles are also more likely to be optimal if frictions (deviations of the model from Walrasian markets) are added. While this cannot be shown in general and will not be true for arbitrary frictions, I demonstrate this in two specific worlds. I consider an economy with search frictions in the labor market, and one with frictions in the goods and credit market. A reasonable parametrization of both economies shows that results change considerably. Even with constant relative risk aversion, cycles can be optimal, whereas this class of preferences rules out cycles in the Lucas-Stokey economy. Finally, I characterize the optimal policy. No more than two tax rates are needed to implement the Ramsey policy both in the Lucas-Stokey economy and in the model with frictions.
Introduction
This paper asks whether tax cycles represent the optimal Ramsey tax policy in the simplest framework possible (Lucas and Stokey (1983) , LS hereafter). There is no uncertainty, no capital or money, and households' only endogenous choices are how much labor to supply and how many bonds to buy. The government issues bonds and taxes labor income to maximize welfare, and can commit to future policies.
The question is then: is it optimal, in a model without any extrinsic uncertainty, to smooth taxes as suggested by Barro (1979) , or are tax cycles welfare-improving?
The explanation why cycles could represent the optimal choice is simple. Mathematically, the reason is the potential non-convexity of the Ramsey optimization problem. First-order conditions are then not sufficient to characterize the optimum: the first-order approach is invalid. The Ramsey planner takes into account the fact that a change in tax rates changes the price of consumption and thus interest rates.
A cycle is optimal whenever this change in interest rates relaxes the government's budget sufficiently to compensate for the welfare loss from the induced variation in consumption, hours and wages. In particular, cycles are fully policy-induced and would not exist without policy.
1
I show that in the LS economy, two classes of preferences exist, with different implications. One class implies that tax smoothing is optimal, whereas within the other class, tax cycles improve welfare. With separability between consumption and leisure, these two classes can be fully and sharply characterized.
(Weakly) Increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) in consumption 2 implies the optimality of tax smoothing, whereas sufficiently strong decreasing relative risk aver-1 Although the question here is whether it is optimal for the Ramsey planner to implement cycles in an acyclical economy, cycles can be the market outcome in other (multi-sector growth) models (McKenzie (1986) , Boldrin and Montrucchio (1995) ).
2 What matters here is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, although the preferences (DRRA, CRRA, IRRA) are classified according to their risk aversion.
sion (DRRA), empirically the more relevant case 3 , implies the optimality of a cycle.
For non-separable preferences, if consumption and leisure are substitutes, the Ramsey policy is characterized by cycles for a larger set of parameter values.
I then derive a simple criterion in subsection 3.2 to check whether a two-period cycle is welfare-improving in the LS economy. This criterion is silent on the shape of the optimal policy. Subsection 3.5 partially fills this gap. An optimal policy (after the initial period) can be implemented by no more than two different tax rates. The optimal policy is either constant or discontinuous. In particular, the optimal policy is not necessarily differentiable as Chamley (1986) assumes in order to verify that cycles are not optimal.
A natural question that then arises is whether IRRA always, in models other than that of LS, rules out cycles as part of the optimal policy. To show that the results apply in models that are more policy-relevant than LS, I show that they also apply in a model with labor market frictions (as in Pissarides (1985 Pissarides ( , 2000 ), and again in Lagos and Wright (2005) , a model with frictions in the goods and credit market. The advantage of choosing these models is that they are close to an LS economy in many respects, permitting analytical results to be derived, which are useful for interpreting my own findings. At the same time, exactly the same frictions which characterize these simple models are also present in much richer models used for policy analysis, so that the possibility of tax cycles being optimal cannot be ruled out a priori for these models either.
Labor market frictions are modeled, following Pissarides (1985 Pissarides ( , 2000 , as search frictions in a search and matching model. The difference from LS is that the only (interesting) decision in LS is how many hours to work, whereas the decision in a search economy is how many vacancies to post. The theoretical results derived for LS are thus applicable. The simple economy differs from Pissarides (1985 Pissarides ( , 2000 in terms of bargaining and in the explicit consideration of intertemporal substitution.
When the model is calibrated in a standard way, I find that cycles become optimal for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
To model product market frictions, I consider the Lagos and Wright (2005) model, which provides a tractable way to deal with two separate frictions. The terms of trade of some transactions are determined through bargaining, and credit cannot be used to pay for these goods. In a parameterized example I find that cycles can improve welfare for all CRRA preferences.
Thus the belief that restricting oneself to IRRA or even CRRA could rule out cycles and potentially validate the first-order approach is not warranted. Cycles can improve welfare even in a simple model, one not too different from the LS world.
Cycles are optimal for two reasons. First, frictions imply that the economy is inefficient (the first welfare theorem does not hold even without a government). If this inefficiency is strong enough, cycles can represent the optimal policy, a result that is already true in the LS economy. 4 Second, prices or wages are not formed in a perfectly competitive market; that is, marginal rates of transformation do not equal marginal rates of substitution. This deviation from LS can make prices and wages and thus tax revenue a more convex function of the allocation.
5
My paper is related to Hassler, Krusell, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2004) (HKSZ), who show that without geometric depreciation of capital, optimal capital income tax rates oscillate. However, their paper differs from mine in that they are not only silent on the properties of labor taxes, but also provide a quite different reason for oscillations (moreover, in HKSZ oscillations generically die out). 6 The 4 In an LS economy, cycles can become the optimal policy if the allocation is sufficiently inefficient (because of higher government expenditures and thus higher taxes).
5 A more sophisticated search economy is considered by Shimer and Smith (2001) , who show that the optimal matching policy can be non stationary. However, the reason for non stationarity is quite different. Ex ante heterogeneity of workers in their model leads to a matching externality which is absent from my model.
timing of taxes is an optimal response to the different depreciation rates of old and new capital, since it allows the inelastically supplied capital stock in period 0 to be partially confiscated (although tax rates are zero in period 0).
7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 considers the optimal policy and its characteristics in the basic Lucas-Stokey economy. Section 4 analyzes a search and matching model of the labor market, while Section 5 investigates the Lagos and Wright (2005) model. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the results. All proofs are delegated to the appendix.
The Model
In this section I describe the Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy without uncertainty.
All prices are determined in competitive Walrasian markets, and households decide how many hours to work, how much to consume and how many bonds to buy. The government finances an exogenous stream of expenditures by levying distortionary labor income taxes and issuing bonds.
Private Sector
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households. Each household's preferences over a stream of consumption and leisure are described by a utility
level, whereby oscillations die out.
7 Kocherlakota (2006) criticizes the arbitrary restriction of tax instruments in the Ramsey approach and argues that the only constraints in a taxation problem should be informational and/or enforcement frictions. This critique applies here as well. But, interestingly, it has been demonstrated in this literature as well that the first-order approach is not valid (Kocherlakota (2004) and Coles (2006) ).
where c t denotes consumption, h t denotes labor and β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the subjective discount factor. The single-period utility function u is assumed to be strictly increasing in c t and strictly decreasing in h t , strictly concave and three times continuously differentiable. u c (t) and u h (t) denote the derivative of period t utility with respect to c and h respectively. There is no uncertainty. In each period t ≥ 0, households can buy one-period government bonds B t+1 , which pay out B t+1 consumption goods in period t + 1. The product market is perfectly competitive, and the production function is assumed to be a linear function of labor h t , F (h t ) = h t . Firms take the real wage w t , which equals 1 in equilibrium, as given. They hire labor h t to maximize profits. Households are paid a net wage rate w t · (1 − τ t ), where τ t is the labor tax rate at period t.
The household's flow budget constraint in period t ≥ 1 is given by:
where 1/R t+1 denotes the period-t price of a claim to one unit of consumption in period t+1. The left-hand side of the budget constraint represents the uses of wealth:
consumption spending and bond purchases. The right-hand side shows the sources of wealth: bonds acquired in the previous period, plus labor income.
The household starts with initial wealth B 0 and is subject to the following borrowing constraint that prevents it from engaging in Ponzi schemes:
where
is the period-zero price of one unit of consumption to be delivered in period t. q 0 is normalized to one.
The household chooses {c t , h t , B t+1 } ∞ t=0 to maximize (1), subject to (2) and (3), taking as given {w t , R t+1 , τ t } ∞ t=0 and initial wealth B 0 .
Government
The government faces a stream of unproductive public consumption g t = g. This is financed by levying labor income taxes at a rate τ t and by issuing one-period bonds.
The government's sequential budget constraint is given by
2.3 Equilibrium Definition 1. Given an initial condition B 0 , a competitive equilibrium is a sequence
such that:
i) The government budget constraint is satisfied for all t ≥ 0.
ii) The household's choice problem is solved.
iii) The goods market clears: c t + g = h t .
iv) Firms maximize profits.
A competitive equilibrium {c t , g t = g, h t , τ t , w t , B t+1 , R t+1 } ∞ t=0 then satisfies the following conditions:
where (5) is the resource constraint, (6) describes an equilibrium in the labor market,
is the household's budget constraint, (8) is the consumption Euler equation, and (9) is the no-Ponzi condition.
In this section I consider whether implementing a constant tax rate is an optimal strategy for the government. I derive a condition to check whether a cycle is superior, and prove the properties of such a non-deterministic policy.
The Ramsey problem
The Ramsey problem is the choice of an implementable allocation which maximizes welfare. The next two definitions state this more precisely.
exists, such that
is a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 3. A Ramsey solution is an allocation that maximizes welfare over all implementable allocations.
I now reproduce the well-known primal-form representation as described in Lucas and Stokey (1983) . The basic idea is to use first-order conditions to eliminate all prices and taxes from the equilibrium conditions. Only the two variables consumption and hours appear in the resulting primal form. This method allows all implementable allocations to be characterized by only two equations. The first of these is the resource constraint (5). To derive the second equation, I start with the intertemporal budget constraint of the representative household:
Since the individual's consumption Euler equation implies that
and as the intratemporal condition implies
can substitute for q t and τ t . The budget constraint can then be written as
which is equivalent to the implementability constraint
The following proposition presents the primal-form characterization for this economy, which says that the implementability constraint and the resource constraint are necessary and sufficient for implementability.
is implementable if and only if
Proof: See Lucas and Stokey (1983) or Chari and Kehoe (1999) .
The Ramsey problem can be stated as choosing consumption c t and labor h t to maximize (1), subject to equations (10) and (11). 8 I restrict myself to B 0 = 0 in what follows since this makes period t = 0 look like all other periods (t > 0). All theoretical results hold without this assumption, and the quantitative implications will be discussed later.
A Criterion for Optimal Cycles
The Ramsey problem is stationary, and a reasonable guess is that a time-invariant allocation is optimal.
8 An upper-bound on hours ensures that the objective function is bounded, and I proceed under the assumption that g is not too large, so that the set of feasible policies is not empty. The same mathematical theorems (for example Tychonoff's theorem) as applied in Aiyagari (1994) Optimality in the definition is conditional on being time-invariant (TI). The logic of the Laffer curve implies that there are multiple TI allocations. 9 The optimal TI allocation picks the solution with the highest welfare. h T I then (not uniquely) solves This reasoning suggests that two numbers are crucial if cycles are to be optimal.
The first of these number is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which determines how much interest rates drop in response to the tax changes described in the previous paragraph. The second number is the wage elasticity of hours worked. This determines how much labor supply decreases (increases) and tax revenues increases (decreases) if the tax rate is increased (decreased).
To assess the (non)optimality of a TI allocation, two concepts have to be intro-duced. Let
be the current value of period t surplus 10 and
be the current value of period t utility.
The convexity of CS(·) is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a TI policy not to be optimal, since otherwise first-order conditions would be sufficient to characterize the Ramsey solution. With convexity of CS, there can be more than one solution to the first-order conditions.
A cyclical policy increases welfare only if the average labor supply increases over the cycle. The increase in welfare is greater the higher CU is at the TI solution
And CU is higher the further h T I is away from the efficient solution. But utility is concave, and thus households prefer a constant consumption level to a cyclical consumption level if both choices have the same average value. This aversion to cycles increases the higher CU is.
To implement a higher labor supply level, taxes have to be lowered. Since average labor supply increases, labor taxes therefore have to decrease on average. The size of this decrease depends on CS . The convexity of CS has to ensure that the present value budget is nevertheless balanced. The higher CS is, the greater is the increase in the government's tax revenues.
To summarize, a tax cycle is optimal if four conditions are met: the time-invariant policy is sufficiently inefficient (CU high); the utility function is not too concave (−CU low) so that the aversion to cycles is not that large; the labor supply is sufficiently responsive to tax changes (−CS low); and tax revenues are sufficiently convex (CS high). Since these four variables (CU , CU , CS , CS ) all depend on 10 Note that CS is indeed the government's primary surplus since (6) implies that CS(h) =
11 f (f ) denotes the first (second) derivative of a one-dimensional function f .
the utility function, they cannot be changed independently from each other. For example, for a utility function of the form
, a lower elasticity of substitution 1 σ increases both −CU and CS . However, two variables, CS and CU , turn out to be key. CS has to be positive to render the problem non-convex. In addition, the economy has to be sufficiently inefficient (CU high), either due to high government expenditures or due to other "frictions", as for example in Sections 4 and 5.
The following theorem presents a condition which indicates when a cycle is welfare-improving. This criterion summarizes the previous arguments and is analyzed in the remainder of this subsection.
Theorem 1. Let (h T I , c T I ) be the optimal TI allocation.
implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A welfare-improving two-period cycle exists.
Derivatives are taken with respect to h. The criterion in the theorem is equivalent to a second-order condition of the constrained maximization problem. The proof uses a perturbation argument to show that a two-period cycle is welfare-improving.
Condition ( * ) can easily be rewritten in terms of primitives. CU , CU , CS , CS depend on the utility function and h T I is a solution to a first-order condition that purely depends on primitives.
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the possibility of a cycle in a two-period model.
Labor supply in the first period h 1 is on the x-axis, and labor supply in the second period h 2 is on the y-axis. The efficient level of labor supply is h * , and h T I is the TI policy. The solid line is the indifference curve of the representative household through the point (h T I , h T I ). Allocations with higher labor supply h generate higher utility as long as h is smaller than h * . The graph also shows curves in the (h 1 , h 2 ) space which generate the same tax revenue as (h T I , h T I ). There are three possibilities for the shape of this curve. In case (I) the curve is concave. In case (II) the curve is convex but "less convex" than the indifference curve. In case (III) the curve is In the first two cases a TI policy is optimal. There is no combination of h 1 and h 2 that generates the same tax revenue as (h T I , h T I ) and higher utility. In case (III), such a combination exists, as indicated by the arrow. A two-period cycle then improves welfare. This is true whenever the tax curve is more convex than the indifference curve. Mathematically both curves describe h 2 as a function of h 1 .
The elasticity of this function equals
for the indifference curve and
for the tax curve. The graphical condition -namely that the tax curve is more convex than the indifference curve -can be expressed as
and is thus equivalent to condition ( * ).
A welfare-improving allocation is located above the indifference curve but below the tax curve. However, condition ( * ) is only a local test since it compares the elasticities of CU and CS around h T I . In particular, condition ( * ) does not hold globally, so that a corner solution does not improve welfare.
Time-invariant Ramsey Policy
There is a class of utility functions such that the optimal TI policy is the Ramsey policy. To my knowledge this result is new. It is not trivial since the implementability constraint need not be convex (for example as in Case (II) in Figure 1 ). Furthermore, a result that non-steady-state capital income tax rates are zero (Chari and Kehoe (1999) ) does not automatically imply that labor tax rates are constant. The wellknown results by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) , namely that steady-state capital income tax rates are zero, does not rule out cycles either. In case the optimality criterion implies that a (discontinuous) cycle should be implemented, a constant allocation is suboptimal. Thus a restriction to steady states is restrictive and cannot be detected through computing dynamics (eigenvalues) around this steady state because of the discontinuity.
where -w exhibits (weakly) increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) and
Then the optimal TI policy is the Ramsey policy.
This theorem applies to classes of preferences considered by the literature (e.g. Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) ). The next two examples provide several functional forms for w and χ which satisfy the assumptions of theorem 2.
Example (Functional forms for w in theorem 2).
The problem is not necessarily convex if χ h (h t ) · h t is not convex. Although this assumption does not follow from standard assumptions on primitives, examples of functional forms for χ are easily found.
Example (Functional forms for χ in theorem 2).
, for some θ > 0 and a time endowment T .
Time-varying Ramsey Policy
The last section showed that for separable preferences which exhibit IRRA, time variation is not optimal. However, this conclusion does not necessarily hold true for the presumably relevant case of DRRA.
12 The next theorem shows that, for the Hansen (1985) preferences, sufficiently strong DRRA leads to the non-optimality of
and τ T I be the tax rate in the optimal TI policy. Set κ and η to zero if the denominator equals zero.
Theorem 3. Let u(c t , h t ) = w(c t ) − A · h t and κ c , η c and τ T I be as defined before.
DRRA is equivalent to 1 + κ c ≤ η c . The criterion says that DRRA has to be sufficiently strong. How strong depends on the size of τ T I . If τ T I approaches 1, a cycle would be optimal for all DRRA preferences, whereas τ T I = 0 implies efficiency and no cycle at all. A cycle is welfare-enhancing if a variation in consumption leads to a variation in prices that is high enough to compensate for the household's aversion 12 See for example Gollier (2001) and Vissing-Jorgenson (2002) , who argue that decreasing relative risk aversion seems to be the empirically relevant case. Note that, for the preferences considered here, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
to this variation in consumption over time. Since the period t price of consumption equals w , the size of the price variation is high if w is high. This is exactly what DRRA achieves.
The previous theorem only considers linear disutility of labor. The condition provided there is a special case of the criterion in the next theorem, which makes no assumptions regarding the functional form of the disutility of labor. It still states that sufficiently strong DRRA leads to cycles. How strong now also depends on the curvature of the disutility of labor. As a result, the condition becomes more complicated than condition ( * * ), which purely focused on the role of DRRA. For
, let τ T I be the tax rate in the optimal TI policy and define
if the denominator is not zero. If the denominator equals zero, set κ or η to zero.
Theorem 4. Let u(c t , h t ) = w(c t )−χ(h t ) and and κ c , η c , κ h , η h and τ T I be as defined before. Then
implies that the optimal TI policy is not the solution to the Ramsey problem. A welfare improving two-period cycle exists.
Note that utility functions that meet the assumptions of theorem 2 (and thus imply that a TI policy is optimal) do not satisfy the criterion in theorem 4. The condition that χ h (h t ) · h t is convex is equivalent to κ h ≥ −2. The next proposition establishes this claim and confirms the intuition that linear utility makes cycles more attractive, as long as κ h ≥ −2 or, equivalently, as long as
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of theorem 4, it holds that:
-If κ h ≥ −2 and 1 + κ c − η c ≥ 0 (IRRA), then condition ( * * * ) is not satisfied.
-If κ h ≥ −2 and if condition ( * * * ) holds, then condition ( * * ) holds.
The second part of the theorem states that, if the criterion in theorem 4 indicates that a cycle improves welfare, then a cycle also improves welfare if disutility is linear (for the same tax rate τ T I and the same κ c and η c ).
the utility function can also render a TI policy nonoptimal. This is for example the
. For this specification of u, cycles are more attractive for a less efficient allocation (due to a higher g), as predicted by criterion ( * ). But for realistic values of government expenditures g, cycles require
values of σ > 10, which is within the range provided by Hall (1988) , but higher than the values usually used in calibration exercises.
Properties of the Ramsey Policy
Theorem 1 shows the nonoptimality of a TI policy through the existence of an improving cycle of length two. It is silent about the optimality of this cycle. The following theorem partially fills this gap. It states that the optimal policy implements only two different tax and labor supply levels.
Theorem 5. The welfare of the optimal Ramsey solution can be arbitrarily well approximated by a policy that implements only two different levels of h if β > 1/2.
13
The idea of the proof is to allow for a specific kind of randomization to convexify the problem and turn it into a linear programming problem. A well-known result in linear programming shows that the support of the optimal (randomizing) policy is not larger than two. It then remains to be shown that the optimal probability distribution of labor supply levels can be implemented by a sequence of tax rates. It is this last step where, because of the specific choice of randomization, the assumption β > 1/2 becomes relevant. An approximation is needed to rule out an infinite number of different tax rates.
So far I have characterized two classes of preferences, one for which time invariance is optimal, and one for which it is not. A possible response could be to 13 Arbitrary approximation means that the difference between the welfare level (and the allocations) of the optimal Ramsey policy and the welfare level of a policy with two tax rates can be made smaller than any > 0.
restrict oneself to the class of preferences where first-order conditions are sufficient, and ignore the problem from then on. This may be a reasonable approach if the model being studied is the LS economy, yet this is very often not the case. Various frictions are built into models in monetary economics (see for example Woodford (2003) and Lagos and Wright (2005) ) and many labor market models incorporate search frictions (Pissarides (2000) ). As the next two sections show, the hope that results from the LS economy carry over to these more elaborated models, which are characterized by several frictions, is not warranted.
I consider two specific economies to stress the role of frictions. I first choose a simple version of a (labor) search and matching economy, in order to approximate the LS economy as close as possible. In both models there is only one interesting market, the labor market, either competitive or characterized through search frictions.
Except for this difference in modeling the labor market, the models are identical. For both types of frictions -in the labor and in the goods market -I find that a reasonable parametrization leads to the conclusion that cycles improve welfare. This suggests that tax cycles are optimal in a large class of models with labor or product market frictions.
A Search and Matching Economy
In this section I consider a search and matching model with the following features.
The equilibrium is inefficient even without government expenditures. As in the LS world, it is an infinite replication of a one-shot economy. Aggregate hours change only because individuals leave and enter employment (as in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) ).
In the chosen environment, there is a continuum of infinitely lived workers and a continuum of infinitely lived firms, each of measure one. At the beginning of each period they are, for the sake of simplicity, all unmatched. This eliminates unemployment as a state variable and makes the economy a replication of oneshot economies. The production function remains unchanged, and workers derive utility u(c t ) from consuming c t at time t. The discount factor is still denoted by β. The number of matches at t is given by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
The probability that a worker will be matched in period t equals E t = m(1, v t ), and the probability that a vacancy will be filled equals
≤ min(v, 1). Wages are formed through bargaining in an alternating offers game as in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) . Hall and Milgrom (2006) show that this bargaining game results in a wage 14 The after-tax wage I t then equals 1 2
(1−τ t +b) and, because of income pooling, each household's after-tax income
The government's policy options and the household budget constraint remain unchanged.
Definition 5. An equilibrium is an initial condition B 0 and a sequence {c t , g t = g, v t , E t , τ t , B t+1 , R t+1 , I t , w t } ∞ t=0 , such that:
i) The government budget constraint is satisfied:
ii) The resource constraint holds: c t + g + kv t = E t .
iii) The household budget constraint is satisfied:
iv) Employment equals the number of matched workers: E t = m(1, v t ). I now turn to the characterization of the set of implementable allocations.
14 Since agreement is immediate in the unique equilibrium of the bargaining game, b only describes the utility derived out of equilibrium. See Hall and Milgrom (2006) 
For this model, I can state a result identical to theorem 1, with CS and CU defined as
Again, I need the concept of time invariance (Definition 4). Here v T I denotes the optimal TI policy, i.e. the constant level of vacancies that is implementable and gives the highest welfare (conditional on being time-invariant). Since further analytical results are not available, I now calibrate the model to check whether condition ( * ),
holds. If it does, then the TI-policy v T I is not the Ramsey policy, and a cycle improves welfare.
Government expenditures and government debt B 0 are set equal to zero. Finally, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) find that profits that do exceed 2.2% of revenue are enough to reimburse firms for their vacancy-posting costs. 17 I also tried other values between 1.5% and 3%. The results are insensitive to these variations.
In the model, profits equal
The utility function is assumed to be
In section 3.3 it was shown that this choice implies no cycles in the LS economy. This result now considerably changes. Table 1 reports, for every value of α, the smallest value for σ, such that a TI policy is not optimal. Rogerson, and Wright (1997) even estimate values of 5.8 and 6.8 (depending on how they detrend the data).
The reason why cycles are more likely in the search model than in the LS model is that prices/wages are determined differently in equilibrium. In the search model wages change when productivity or the tax rate changes, but do not depend on labor market conditions, such as the number of vacancies or the unemployment rate. 
is not
19 Hall and Milgrom (2006) argue that a realistic threat in a bargaining game between a firm and a worker about a joint surplus is to extend bargaining, and not to terminate it and look for another match. As a consequence, the cost of delay matters for wage determination, not external labor market conditions. a concave function of c t and v t . Therefore the arguments in the proof of theorem 2 do not apply and, as the quantitative exercise above shows, cycles can improve welfare.
I now use the parameterized model to quantify the welfare effects of implementing a two-period cycle. Theorem 5, which is also applicable in the search and matching model, states that the optimal policy implements only two different levels of vacancies, but not necessarily a two-period cycle. Numerically however I was unable to find a policy that improves upon a two-period cycle. I thus report the welfare gains from implementing such a cycle, bearing in mind that theoretically it is only a lower bound.
The computational strategy is straightforward. I simply compute the welfare for all two-period cycles (for an appropriate grid on the vacancy space). I then choose the cycle which maximizes welfare, and compare it to the welfare from implementing the TI policy v T I . Finally, I express the welfare gain in terms of consumption equivalents. As in Lucas (1987) , this measure is defined as the percentage compensation required to make a household indifferent between consumption plans with and without a two-period tax cycle. This number is larger than 0 if a cycle improves welfare, and equals 0 if not. 
Non-Walrasian Product and Credit Markets
In this section I show that a TI policy is not optimal in a parameterized example of the Lagos and Wright (2005) (LW) model. I choose this model since it provides a tractable way to deal with two deviations from the LS economy. First, the product market is not Walrasian. Instead, prices and quantities (of some but not all) goods are determined through bargaining. Second, credit cannot be used to pay for these goods, and in its place a liquid asset, which has to be acquired in advance, is required. Thus in the LW model, both the product market and the credit market have frictions. Since the model does not restrict the interpretation of what this liquid asset is, one can think of it as money (as in LW) or as bonds (as in Lagos (2005)).
However, this freedom of interpretation makes a quantitative analysis problematic (see below). I now describe the model and then explain how it fits into the "onedecision" framework of this paper.
Time is discrete and there is a measure one of infinitely-lived agents. Every period is divided into two subperiods. In the first subperiod, agents trade in frictionless markets, followed by a subperiod with trading frictions. I follow the terminology of LW, referring to the frictionless market as the centralized market (CM), and the market with frictions as the decentralized market (DM).
The government buys g t = g goods in the CM only and has three ways of paying for this: a labor tax τ t , nominal government bonds B t , and nominal money creation.
The government's flow budget constraint is
where M t+1 is nominal money outstanding at the end of period t, P t is the nominal price level in the CM, and R t is the gross nominal return on bonds. The remaining notation is as in the previous sections.
The household enters the CM in period t with M t units of money and B t bonds, and derives utility W t (M t , B t ). It decides how much labor h t to supply, how much to consume c t and how many bonds B t+1 to buy. Production in the CM is, as in LS, a linear function of labor, F (h t ) = h t . In addition to these decisions, which are identical to those taken in the LS economy, every agent can acquire M t+1 units of money, which are needed to trade in the subsequent DM. The value of entering the DM with M t+1 units of money and B t+1 bonds is denoted V t (M t+1 , B t+1 ). The CM problem is
subject to
Note that LW assume that utility in the CM is linear in labor. This assumption makes the model analytically tractable since (M t+1 , B t+1 ) is independent from (M t , B t ). In addition, it simplifies the analysis of the DM, since every agent holds the same amount of money.
In the DM, Lagos and Wright (2005) assume that with probability α the household is a buyer, with probability α the household is a seller, and with probability 1 − 2α the household does not trade. A buyer consumes q in the DM and derives utility u(q), while a seller produces q at a cost c(q). u is concave, c is convex and
where q(M t+1 ) is the quantity produced by the seller and d(M t+1 ) is the amount paid by the buyer to the seller. This payment has to be in terms of money,
The terms of trade q and d are determined through Nash bargaining, where the buyer has bargaining power θ. Instead of repeating the derivation in LW, I simply restate the results. Let q * be defined by u (q * ) = c (q * ). Then the solution is
and where
. I can now define an equilibrium.
Definition 7. Given initial conditions B 0 and M 0 , an equilibrium is a sequence
i) The government budget constraint is satisfied.
ii) The resource constraint in the CM holds: c t + g = h t .
iii) The household budget constraint (16) is satisfied. iv) Households choose c t , h t , B t+1 and M t+1 in the CM to maximize utility. v) Firms in the CM maximize profits.
vi) The terms of trade in the DM are determined through Nash bargaining.
vii) The no-Ponzi condition holds: lim t→∞ q t B t = 0.
In equilibrium it always holds that M t+1 < M * t+1 . An implementable allocation can be defined as follows:
is imple-
is an equilibrium.
Using standard techniques (taken from Lucas and Stokey (1983) ), Aruoba and Chugh (2006) derive the implementability constraint for this economy and characterize the set of implementable allocations.
As is well known (see for example Chari and Kehoe (1999) ), it is necessary to set M 0 + B 0 = 0 to make the problem interesting (otherwise the Ramsey planner confiscates the entire initial nominal wealth), and I therefore proceed under this assumption. Since the nominal interest R t+1 equals α( (23) is equivalent to a zero bound on nominal interest rates. For the interpretation of
− 1), note that z(q t ) = M t+1 βχ t and U c (c t ) = P t χ t−1 (because utility is quasi-linear in the CM). This implies that
, the same expression as in Chari and Kehoe (1999) . 20 For a more detailed interpretation, see Aruoba and Chugh (2006) .
The Ramsey solution then maximizes
over all implementable allocations. The resource constraint in the CM again implies that c t is a simple function of h t , but there is now a second variable, q t . Nevertheless, the analysis of cycles in the main text can only be applied to the choice of q t . The same arguments can be used to derive a criterion when the implementation of a time invariant q T I is not optimal (and h is constant and equals the TI solution h T I ). The criterion for the choice of q is then identical to that in theorem 1 if
I can now evaluate the criterion to assess whether a cycle can improve welfare.
Since an analytical evaluation is unavailable, I am obliged to resort to a numerical example. I therefore have to choose functional forms for U, u and c and values for the remaining parameters.
In the CM I set U (c) = log(c), A = 1/2, so that cycles in the CM are ruled out by theorem 2. In the DM, the utility function equals u(q) = (q+κ) 1−η −κ 1−η 1−η + 1, the cost function c(q) = exp(q 2 /2), κ = 1 and α = 0.1. This choice of functional forms would rule out cycles in an LS economy, and cycles would be a rather bad idea since c is very convex. The assumptions needed in LW for the existence of an equilibrium (u(0) = c(0) is finite) make it necessary to add a κ to the utility function and to add 1 to the utility function.
The choice of the functional forms and of α could be guided by two observations in the data, the demand elasticity of M and the level of velocity, i.e. nominal output divided by M . Unfortunately this is somewhat problematic, in particular since these 20 In this paper
Rt+1 equals the marginal utility of money divided by U c .
numbers depend on the interpretation of M in the data. For example, the velocity of bonds is much lower than the velocity of M1. The elasticity of money also depends on the time period. For example, the correlation between M 1/GDP and a shortterm nominal interest rate is positive for the last 25 years, although it was negative before then. Instead, I use the parameter values as described above, and report the results for the velocity and the demand elasticity.
I vary three parameters, η, the curvature parameter of u, θ, the bargaining power of the buyer and g, government expenditures. For θ = 1, the model with bargaining is equivalent to a model with competitive price-taking in the DM (see Rocheteau and Wright (2005) ). (2005), such as the size of the CM, the share of government expenditure and the elasticity of money demand. The velocity of money and the elasticity of money demand seem to be reasonable (of course, this statement is subject to the measurement problems discussed above). The size of the government is quite small, between 13% and 17% of CM output.
The time-invariant q is denoted q T I , and q Cy is the constant level of q that makes the representative household indifferent between consumption plans with and without a two-period tax cycle. The percentage gain q Cy q T I of a cycle in terms of DM consumption is quite large. For example, for g = 0.4 and η = 1 (log preferences), the consumption gain in the DM, q Cy q T I , is close to 50%. The welfare gain can also be expressed in terms of CM consumption. A household is indifferent between 3.97% higher consumption in the CM and a two-period cycle. As already observed, a higher value of η unambiguously makes a cycle more likely to be optimal. Changing the value of the buyer's bargaining power θ has two main, potentially opposing, effects on the shape of these curves.
First, θ determines how inefficient q T I is. This affects the criterion ( * ) mainly through changing CU . The lower θ is, the smaller the buyer's share of the surplus in the DM. This leads to higher prices and less trade in the DM. Table 2 The credit market frictions which arise endogenously in LW lead to a functional form for CS, which differs from approaches where money is an argument of the utility function (Chari and Kehoe (1999) ). This has two consequences. First, the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal, which implies that q T I is not efficient even if θ = 1. This is a necessary condition for a cycle, since efficiency means CU = 0 and the criterion ( * ) cannot be fulfilled. The second implication is that the credit market friction adds an additional nonlinearity to the function that maps quantities into tax revenue (CS). In the labor search model and also in LW if θ < 1, bargaining leads to a nonlinear deviation from the Walrasian mapping of quantities into prices, and thus mechanically also changes the mapping from quantities into tax revenue. On top of that, only the medium of exchange is taxed in LW and not trading, which adds some nonlinearity to the mapping from quantities to tax revenues even if pricing is competitive (CS becomes positive).
To analyze how the size of the friction affects the likelihood of an optimal tax cycle, I consider now the experiment of decreasing α, i.e. the probability that money is needed in the DM. A decrease in α can be interpreted as an increase in the probability ρ that credit can be used in a DM meeting. In the benchmark, ρ = 0 and an agent is a buyer, needing money with probability α = 0.1. A value of α = 0.05 then means that with probability 0.1 an agent is a buyer, but needs money only in 50% of these meetings and can pay with credit otherwise. If credit frictions are fully removed (α = 0), money is not needed and credit can be used in all transactions.
In this limiting case the economy is identical to an LS economy, and a TI policy is optimal in both the CM and the DM. q T I , since the denominator becomes a small number. A cycle is also more likely to be welfare-improving as explained above. The less efficient the economy becomes (the lower q T I ), the higher CU is, making it then more likely that condition ( * ) holds. There is no extrinsic uncertainty that would result in cycles.
In an LS economy, a large class of preferences exists where cycles are optimal. I show that sufficiently strong DRRA implies that cycles are optimal, whereas IRRA implies that they are not.
I then consider two simple models with frictions: a labor search and matching economy, following Pissarides (2000) ; and the Lagos and Wright (2005) economy, a model with frictions in the goods and credit market. A cycle is now optimal for a class of preferences that was considered to imply the opposite in the Lucas-Stokey world. Thus the results established for the Lucas-Stokey economy, which guaranteed optimal tax smoothing for a certain class of preferences, do not prove to carry over to all models of interest.
My results suggest the possibility that cycles could improve welfare. This is especially true in models with frictions, which invalidate the first welfare theorem and lead to noncompetitive pricing.
21 For specific applications, the theorems in this paper are helpful along two dimensions. First, they can imply that cycles are never welfare-improving, so that one can proceed with a first-order approach. Second, they provide a condition to check whether a cycle can improve welfare. Although this condition has to be checked in every application, it provides some guidance to the features that potentially lead to cycles: inefficient allocations, and non linear pricing that leads to a convex tax revenue function.
Proofs Proof of Theorem 1
In principle, four cases have to be considered. Labor supply can be too high (CU < 0) or too low (CU > 0), and tax revenue can be increasing (CS > 0) or decreasing (CS < 0) in h. Two cases can be ruled out immediately if we allow for transfers from the government to the household (this means the implementability constraint becomes an inequality constraint; in any case I use this "trick" later.). If CU > 0 and CS > 0, an increase in labor supply is welfare-improving and raises tax revenues.
Conversely, if CU < 0 and CS < 0, a decrease in labor supply is welfare-improving and raises tax revenues. Two cases remain. In Case I, the labor supply is too low (CU > 0) and cutting taxes decreases tax revenue (CS < 0). In Case II, labor supply is too high (CU < 0) and the economy is on the downside of the Laffer curve, so that lowering taxes increases tax revenue (CS > 0). In Case I ( * ) is 21 Adding capital to these models (and allowing for capital income taxation) would change the quantitative results but not the main conclusions of the paper.
equivalent to
and in Case II ( * ) is equivalent to
I use a perturbation argument to show that a TI policy is not optimal. Consider two consecutive periods (t and t+1) where the same amount of labor h T I is implemented.
In the first period, labor supply is increased by ∆ ≥ 0. In the second period, labor supply is decreased by δ/β ≥ 0. Let S(∆, δ) be the present value surplus and V (∆, δ) the present value utility from these two periods (evaluated at h T I ). Thus
If multiple solutions exist, the smallest δ is chosen. Define δ
If condition ( * ) holds, it will be shown that for small ∆, a joint increase by ∆ in the first period and a decrease by δ(∆)/β in the second period increase both S and V .
An increase in S means that this policy change is implementable by proposition 14, while an increase in V means that this policy change is welfare-improving.
Thus letS andB be defined as follows:
.
Consider first derivatives with respect to ∆:
This shows that a linear approximation does not produce an affirmative answer.
Therefore the sign of the second derivatives is decisive:
where the inequality sign follows in case I from ( * I ) and CS (h T I ) < 0, and in case II from ( * II ) and CS (h T I ) > 0. The same calculations for V result in:
where the inequality sign again follows in case I from ( * I ) and CU (h T I ) > 0, and in case II from ( * II ) and CU (h T I ) < 0.
The Ramsey problem is to choose c t and h t to maximize utility subject to implementability and resource constraints. In a first step it is shown that both these constraints can be written as inequalities, such that the (relaxed) Ramsey problem reads as follows:
Suppose first that in the (relaxed) maximization problem, the resource constraint is fulfilled with strict inequality for some t. Then decreasing h t improves welfare and still satisfies the relaxed implementability constraint (the implementability constraint is decreasing in h t ).
Thus the resource constraint is fulfilled with equality for all t, and c t = h t − g.
Suppose now that the implementability constraint is fulfilled with strict inequality.
Then for some t:
(w c (c t ) · c t − χ h (h t ) · h t ) > 0.
Since c t + g = h t ,:
0 < (w c (c t ) · c t − χ h (h t ) · h t ) = w c (c t ) · (h t · (1 − χ h (h t )/w c (c t )) − g)
Thus increasing h t and c t by the same (small) amount improves welfare. The relaxed implementability constraint is still fulfilled, since it was assumed to hold with strict inequality.
These arguments imply that the solution to the relaxed problem fulfills both constraints with equality. Therefore the solution to the relaxed problem and the solution to the Ramsey problem coincide.
A substitution of variables v t := w(c t ) results in an equivalent maximization problem (P * ) which reads as follows:
for all feasible v t (those where a c t exists such that v t = u(c t ), ψ(v) = w −1 (v) and ϕ(c) = w c (c) · c.
It will be shown that this problem is convex for IRRA utility functions. This amounts to showing that both constraints are convex.
This is true for the resource constraint, since the inverse of any increasing concave utility function is convex.
For the implementability constraint, κ(v) := ϕ(ψ(v t )) has to be a concave function (concave since the inequality sign is ≥ and not ≤.). χ h (h t ) · h t is a convex function by assumption, so that Since problem (P * ) is strictly concave, first-order conditions for every t have a unique solution (v * t , h * t ). Since first-order conditions are necessary for an optimum, (v * t , h * t ) is the optimal choice at t. Furthermore, since the maximization problem is identical for all t, the same (v * , h * ) is implemented in every period t. As problem (P * ) is equivalent to the Ramsey problem, (c * := w −1 (v * ), h * ) is the optimal choice in every period.
Proof of Theorem 3
This follows from theorem 4. 
Proof of Theorem 5
For a fixed set of labor supply levels {h 1 , . . . h n }, consider the following convexified problem:
where v(h t ) = u(h t − g, h t ) and γ(h t ) = u c (h t − g, h t ) · (h t − g) + u h (h t − g, h t ) · h t .
A π is called admissible if it fulfills (28)-(30). It is a standard result in linear programming (see e.g. Dantzig (1963) ) that a corner (or vertex or extreme point) solution is optimal, where a corner is defined as follows:
Definition 9. An admissible π = {π 1 , . . . , π n } is a corner (or vertex or extreme point) if for all admissibleπ = {π 1 , . . . ,π n } andπ = {π 1 , . . . ,π n } and λ ∈ (0, 1):
I show next that for a corner π, at most two π i are not zero. Suppose there is a corner with a support larger than two. Thus there exist three different i (i 1 , i 2 , i 3 )
such that π i 1 , π i 2 , π i 3 = 0. I now defineπ = π andπ = π such that 1 2π
π is not a corner. Note that without loss of generality all γ j := γ(h i j ) (j ∈ {1, 2, 3})
take different values, since for the same γ value, only the h that gives the highest utility is chosen. Defineπ
π i 2 := π 2 + (33)
π i 2 := π 2 − (36)
for some sufficiently small > 0. For all other indices,π,π and π coincide.
Sinceπ andπ are admissible and fulfill 1 2π
= π, π is not a corner.
Thus the solution of the convexified problem has the desired property of a support not larger than two.
I now show that this is also the case for the Ramsey problem. Suppose the Ramsey problem implements labor supply levels h 1 , . . . h n , where h i is implemented at dates I i := {t | h t = h i }. Define π as follows:
Since the Ramsey solution fulfills the implementability constraint, π is admissible.
The above arguments show that an admissibleπ exists with a support not larger than two, which produces the same welfare level. This implies that
for some 1 ≤ i 1 , i 2 ≤ n.
I now show that J 1 , J 2 ⊂ N 0 exist, such that J 1 ∪ J 2 = N 0 and
(1 − β)
